Introduction

T his paper investigates the determinants of mergers among Prussian miners' social
insurance funds between 1861 and 1920. The so-called Knappschaften provided compulsory insurance on a pay-as-you-go basis. The insurance contract obligated each miner to make a regular contribution payment to his fund, and, in return, he would receive insurance benefits conditional on the occurrence of particular events. Knappschaften (henceforth abbreviated with KVs for German Knappschaftsvereine) were to insure against sickness, injuries, invalidity, survivorship, and also -yet implicitly -oldage. The corresponding benefit package included income-replacement benefits, such as sick pay and pensions and in-kind benefits such as medical treatment.
Focusing on the formative period of the German welfare state, this investigation is motivated by an important stylized fact: Starting in the 1870s, absolute and relative concentration among KVs steadily increased. The underlying concentration process was not driven just by unequal internal growth, but by liquidations and mergers in particular. Aside from the fact that we can observe this wave of external growth among those pioneers of social insurance, the decision-making process itself, involving miners, their ' employers, the state, as well as contemporary observers as external opinion makers, is still pretty much a black box.
Contemporary observers and the recent economic literature suggest two well-known motives for insurance mergers during the period investigated in this paper. On the one hand, mergers might have been conducted to take financial pressure off KVs. Some
KVs were struggling due to the structural decline of the mining area, to which they were tied, and due to business cycle fluctuations or actuarial disadvantages, such as being too small or lacking actuarial expertise. Both facts, it is surmised, eventually drove the KVs and their insurants to financial disaster. I call this the «rescue-hypothesis». From this perspective, mergers were conducted in order to stabilize the job-related insurance scheme in Prussian mining as a whole. This could have worked only if at least one of the following conditions was fulfilled: (i) Miners and mine owners, who together selfmanaged their KVs, felt highly responsible for their fellows and unanimously considered it an act of solidarity to help financially distressed KVs; and (2) the mining administration, hence the industry regulator, forced mergers upon KVs according to its own aims and regardless of whether or not miners and mine owners agreed. On the other hand, mergers might have been conducted simply because the absorbing KV aimed to seek growth opportunities and advantages -for example, in the form of cost reductions by improving one's own actuarial fundamentals. I call this the «self-interest» hypothesis.
Here, solidarity is not required. Rather, the regulator would have been required to tolerate any merger conducted or refused. A third hypothesis, however, might be that mergers, and maybe even liquidations, were the consequence of accidental, ad-hoc decisions rather than planned and conscious action.
In order to open the black box of mergers among KVs, this investigation combines a qualitative analysis of contemporary economic arguments for mergers and statistical evidence on the determinants of the concentration process. The basic assumption of this paper that external growth was due mainly to an economic rationale seems to be justified for two reasons. First, this view dominates the contemporary literature on KVs.
Second, source material on board meetings, which would directly indicate whether decisions to merge or to liquidate were done for non-economic reasons, is currently unavailable. Accordingly, the analysis is done in four consecutive steps: First, data sources are explained. Second, in order to convey an impression of the basic economic and social conditions under which KVs operated, the German mining industry's development is briefly reviewed and linked with an overview of the KVs. Third, contemporary arguments for mergers and concentration are evaluated. Fourth, an empirical survival model, based on Fine and Gray's' competing risk approach, is presented yielding additional statistical insights.
Most contemporary sources convey the impression that KVs were to be merged to stabilize the entire insurance scheme by sorting out actuarially unviable and financially distressed funds. In contrast, statistical evidence suggests that the KVs were absorbed over time primarly because they offered advantages to the absorbing KVs and, hence were quite attractive targets. This contradicts the rescue-hypothesis and the idea of cross-KV solidarity.
This investigation itself is part of larger project on the origins and development of the occupational social insurance systems developed in the German mining, railroad, and shipping sectors, a project which takes an interdisciplinary approach, combining historical and economic methods. into another fund that had already existed before the merger and continued to exist afterwards. 5 The latter (type B) happened when two or more KVs merged to create a new fund.
German mining and the Knappschaften -an overview By the middle of the 1850s, German miners could already look back at 600 years of experience with mutuality in risk provision. Almost from the start, mine owners were part of the system as sponsors. As a consequence of the Knappschaft law of 1854, both miners and their employers entered into a new era, the one of «social insurance». Like few other industries -e. g., the shipping and railway sectors 6 -the KVs pioneered the field of organizing social insurance against the contingencies of life, the consequences of which everyone feared, and no one could shoulder on his or her own. There is no doubt that mining, especially deep mining for coal, was amongst the most perilous occupations connected with a high ex ante probability of becoming involved in accidents and suffering from severe chronic diseases (e.g. silicosis) or epidemics (e.g. hookworm), not least because matters of work safety and hygiene were put on the agenda only gradually. 7 Since KVs were an integral part of the German mining industry, their business policy and the economic and social challenges they faced can only be understood against the background of the industry's secular trends and peculiarities. Thus, some general contextualization seems to be in order.
Industry structure and administrative units
German mining might seem, at first glance, to be focused just on coal, and particularly hard coal. In the nineteenth century, hard coal certainly became the single most important natural resource, and most miners -hence most KV members -were engaged in extracting it. However, extractive activities concentrated on a number of resources, diverse in their properties and, thus, geological circumstances of production. In the following, I refer to these various resources as <subsectors> of the mining sector. According to German national statistics, we can identify the following subsectors: (1) hard coal, (2) brown coal, (3) iron ore, (4) miscellaneous ores, (5) halite, (6) salts, (7) pyrite, and (8) the rest. Based on that structure, the Prussian KV statistics, introduced in the previous section, identify the number of active miners -in my terms «contributors» -per subsector per KV. It does so for (i) to (4) and adds additional categories, namely stone pits, steelworks and other smelting works (for zinc ore and so on). 9 Hence, on aggregate KVs reflected industry structure in terms of membership according to Table one. The share of hard coal miners, for example, increased from 55.4 per cent of all contributors in 1867 to about 75 per cent in 1916. Of the whole universe of 103 Prussian KVs, 18 funds insured predominantly hard coal miners. There are not many cases in which a KV's membership arose from only one subsector -KVs tied to salts or many steelworks, for example. In addition, 15 KVs wich can not be ascribed to one of the subsectors mentioned can only really be labeled as mixed ones.
The German mining sector had its own administrative foundation. The parts of Prussia's territory where mining took place were divided into five mining-administration regions (Oberbergamtsbezirke): (1) Bonn -mostly congruent with the province Rhineland and encompassing the Saar as well as Aachen coalfields, (2) Breslau -where the coalfields of Upper and Lower Silesia were located, (3) Clausthal -congruent with the province Hannover and containing the Harz coal and ore fields, (4) Dortmund -mostly congruent with the province Westphalia and containing the Ruhr coalfields, and (5) Halle -encompassing the province Saxony and containing important brown coal and ore fields. Within the geographical boundaries of those administrative units, the KVs were operated locally -e.g., for a small coal or ore field (and all enterprises there) or a particular mine -or regionally -for a larger mining area (and all the enterprises there). Fourth, as Table two shows, production capacity in hard coal, brown coal and ore mining in terms of the workforce increased notably as well. The expansion of the workforce is probably the best indicator of production capacity expansion, since mining was a very labour-intensive activity despite various approaches to mechanizing production and implementing labour-saving techniques. 17 Table two In addition to those figures, crude death rates also suggest that mining was extremely hazardous. Table 3 reports, on the one hand, the number of deaths among 1,000 contributors of KVs per subsector and, on the other hand, the deaths per 1,000 in the German population. This comparison is, of course, imperfect, since national figures include more than just the economically active male population. Nonetheless the rates give an indication of the comparatively high probability of death, while working as a miner, as compared to the national average. Figures also indicate differences across subsectors, diminishing rates toward World War I and a heavy increase in rates during war. Diminishing rates may have been a result of improved medical treatment or improved work safety, although Boyer concludes that, after 1871, safety regulations had not improved much beyond pre-Reich standards.
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Features of Knappschaften
19th century observers often interpreted early voluntary associations of miners in the Middle Ages as reflecting the very uniqueness of their occupation, the unparalleled hazards for health and the ability to work, and thus the above-average need for income increased by about 753 per cent whereas the number of pensioners to be financed increased at an even higher rate, implying an increasing financial burden put on the average contributor. However, while there were always more survivors than invalidity pensioners, invalids were far more costly, as columns (7) and (8) show. At the minimum, about 47 to 50 per cent of pension expenditure was spent for invalidity pensions. 33 On the whole, aggregate expenditure data indicate a great expansion of social spending within the KVs' benefit scheme. This applies to all main claims categories including sickness-related benefits. 34 Extensive growth was due, on the one hand, to the expansion of the workforce and, on the other hand, especially to the rising relative numbers of pensioners. Additionally, many KVs increased per capita payout, which also led to intensive growth of expenditures. 35 Columns (4), (9) and (10) give an indication of the aggregate social significance of KVs compared to Bismarckian social insurance.
While, in 1871, all Prussian KVs' insurants together amounted to 0.67 per cent of the German population, they accounted for 2.17 per cent in 1920. In contrast, the coverage of Bismarckian health and invalidity insurance was notably higher, starting with 9.7 per cent regarding the former and about 22 per cent regarding the latter.
In order to assess the concentration phenomenon -the focus of this investigation - Table 2 ). The concentration process that obviously took place in Prussian Knappschaft insurance was driven by a combination of internal and external growth of KVs. Clearly, if the coal or ore fields, for which a KV was responsible, experienced long-term prosperity, the KV did so, too. If local or regional resource deposits, however, came near economic or technical exhaustion, production stagnated, and so did the KV. This is simply because mine owners would have reacted by adjusting production capacities -capital such as steam or electrical engines, other technical equipment, shafts, and the workforce -downwards. It was definitely the labor input that could be cut most rapidly to reduce costs. Maybe with a time lag, a KV would have seen a steady decline in memberships, for the most part due to young recruits staying away, but also due to labor turn-over into other KV areas.
Mergers -a consequence of business policy or industry regulation?
According to the basic regulations of 1854 and 1865, the mining administration no longer ran KVs on the government's behalf. concerned that firms were making decisions according to their own interests, thanks to Elders who often elected representatives more friendly to employers than to their official principals. 40 Lauf has recently stressed that the mine owners or salaried managers had a clear intellectual advantage over Elders, which gave them «opinion-leadership». 41 Besides, employers could credibly threaten to fire uncooperative elder miners (as long as they were active, of course) or influence the loyalty to their boss by giving them some kind of administrative tasks in the KVs (monitoring absence through sickness, for example). 42 As Geyer argues, in order to understand KV business policy and who profited most from decisions, it is crucial to know who really ruled the KVs.
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Based on the assumption that employers and employees indeed had different interests, the modes of social and economic interaction between miners, owner-managers or salaried managers, and the state as provider of the relevant regulatory framework, especially regarding conflict regulation, have attracted much scholarly attention. 44 The industrial relations historiography has one important implication for this paper: Conflicts of interest between miners and their employers existed about contractual issues, working conditions, safety issues and also mine owners' paternalistic attitudes, and these conflicts deepened when miners increasingly formed organized opposition in trade unions.
Therefore, these conflicts must also have been faced by the KV boards and must have influenced their decision-making process -at least, to a certain extent.
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It is still unclear which role the different actors -the KV boards' members, the firms as the opinion leaders, the state as the regulator, and the external expertise of contemporary observers -played. It also remains unclear why one of the alternatives -(1) continuation of operation, (2) merger or (3) liquidation -was chosen in a particular period.
This investigation is intended to explore whether economic, and especially actuarial, motives may be assumed. In general, the economic literature proposes a variety of motives to merge: to increase the market share, diversify risks, exploit economies of scale and scope, reach minimum efficient size, and to avoid insolvency. 46 From the opinion in the literature that, in the end, it was the firms that dominated KV boards, it follows that business policy was very likely to reflect mine owners' interests in the first instance. What, though, were their interests in the final analysis? In my view, their main interest was, indeed, economic at its core, namely being able to maintain a workforce as healthy, as satisfied and as productive as possible at the lowest possible costs.
Several findings in my statistical analysis will be quite in line with this view. Since employers' contributions to KVs were a true cost item -and more so after implementing additional labor costs due to co-financing Bismarckian insurance -employers were arguably interested in keeping costs as low as possible. The point is that a KV entering into a state of financial difficulty for whatever reason -business-cycle fluctuations, structural decline, long-term demographic changes, or erratic expenditure shocks due to accidentsmeant additional costs for firms. If, for example, the number of pensioners relative to contributors had risen, this inevitably would have required raising contributions, which firms also would have had to pay. Hence, it was in the economic interest of firms to operate a financially healthy KV. In fact, contemporary discussion on actuarial deficiencies of KVs, which I summarize in the following subsection, gave the firms attractive arguments for how to improve a fund's financial soundness from an actuarial perspective.
Contemporary arguments in favour of mergers
During the 19th century, according to Borscheid, the financial innovation «insurance» became more and more prevalent. Commercial voluntary insurance focused much on life insurance, while compulsory social insurance addressed, in particular, the risk of sickness and invalidity. 47 Soon after 1854, when the «era of social insurance» began for KVs, contemporaries started to discuss structural problems of those funds that were directly related to their role as insurance providers. This historical debate in the literature was at its core actuarial, and the main arguments were linked with the issue of KV size and the weaknesses of the pay-as-you-go method. Hence, focusing on the contemporary arguments in favour of mergers sheds some light on the available actuarial knowledge at the time.
Julius Hiltrop, for example, argued as early as 1869 that many KVs were, on the one hand, too small to ensure actuarial stability of their pension insurance scheme and, on the other hand, too large to successfully control for moral hazard in their health insurance scheme:
«Of greatest importance for a KV's usefulness and efficiency, however, is its size. 49 Another contemporary, Peter Simons, suggested that larger KV areas, achievable by mergers, would result in a de-coupling of local or even regional economic growth or decline and a KV's financial state. This was because growing areas, where deposits were still rich, could cross-subsidize stagnating areas, where deposits were close to economic or technical exhaustion. 50 An industry regulator would very probably like this argument since it implied greater stability for the entire insurance scheme. Employers, as well as miners, in a prosperous mining area, however, would very probably not have liked to see their prosperity being redistributed to stagnating areas.
Obviously, contemporaries believed that running a pension scheme required a minimum efficient size that was larger compared to the minimum efficient size of health insurance; we may define it as the size beyond which there were no economies of scale The law of large numbers in its empirical formulation says that the relative frequency of a particular event converges towards its true, but unknown, probability of occurrence, the more observations are included.
Contemporaries like Caron or Karwehl, indeed, argued explicitly on the basis of the law of large numbers. Smaller KVs were said to be much more vulnerable than larger KVs to unpredictable events such as accidents or fluctuations in the number of contributors and pensioners. Thus they had a higher ex ante variance of the average claim, which is equal to a larger bandwidth of possible positive or negative outcomes. Just as buying insurance reduces uncertainty about an individual's future income, expanding the collective of insurants reduces uncertainty about future states of finances on the side of the insurer himself. Caron also talked about a steady state (Behammgszustand), in which all fundamental actuarial data -the inflow of new members per age group, the outflow of contributors due to death, turn-over or invalidity, and the outflow of pensioners due to death, among others -remained unchanged over a very long time period, so that perfect predictability of financial needs was achieved. This steady state, however, was claimed to require a large size, with the law of large numbers coming into effect.
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As a consequence of actuarial considerations, mergers of small KVs into larger ones, or even mergers of all KVs into one fund for Prussia or Germany as a whole, were repeatedly demanded. 54 In particular, it was postulated to separate pension from sickness insurance in order to allow for different fund sizes in the quite distinct insurance sections. Caron, for example, claimed: «Consequently, the first basic condition for a structural reform of Knappschaft insurance is to form sufficiently large Knappschaft areas so that the law of large numbers comes into effect. Thus it would be perfect to merge all Prussian KVs into one pension insurance fund.» 55 Karwehl furthermore stated: «Further concentration is truly essential. Besides some other disadvantages for comrades arising from high fragmentation, small and smallest KVs are by far not able to accomplish their social tasks.»
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Besides considering KV size as a major issue, contemporaries also discussed the usefulness of the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) method, which KVs universally chose to finance expenditures. In a PAYGO system current health and pension expenditures in a given period are financed by revenues of the currendy employed. KVs probably chose the PAYGO method because it enabled them to immediately pay out pensions without relying on the accumulation of reserves for each miner or each generation (birth cohort). Contemporaries were definitely aware of the sensitivity of the PAYGO method to long-term demographic changes or sudden financial shocks. However, they seem not to have considered the method formally, as something that could be depicted as an equation, but intuitively knew that rising numbers of pensioners per contributor or rising numbers of sick days per contributor necessarily required adjustments of the contribution rate and the gross pension level. Jopp shows that those adjustments widely led to diminishing implicit rates of return over time, hence postponing of financing burdens, arising from the increasing number of pensioners. In particular, the large KVs in the growing mining areas could keep implicit rates by and large constant over time.
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There is no evidence at all that contemporaries really thought about implicit rates of return. They did not even explicitly argue on the basis of the pensioners-to-contributors ratio's (PCR) direct relation to PAYGO budget restrictions. 58 and they thought that the «golden path» to sustainability -i.e., a situation in which every generation of miners would be treated equallywas to increase size and to select out unviable KVs for reform, often through merger.
The industry regulator's intentions
The mining administration as the industry regulator most likely shared the view that increasing the KVs' size by mergers was a useful strategy. In fact, the regulations of 1854
and 1865 did not say much on this topic, merely that a KV should be neither too small nor too large. 59 Prior to the reform of Knappschaft law in 1906, however, the administration exerted some verbal pressure. Hilt, for example, informs us about an attempt in 1870, essentially initialized by mining official Hermann Brassert, to merge all KVs in the region of Bonn into one pension fund; this attempt failed because most firms opposed the proposal. 60 Another attempt of the administration to clear its position regarding size and mergers was the ministerial decree of 1883, in which it reads: «It has been repeatedly stated that the fusion of small KVs among themselves or with a larger fund is the appropriate way to ensure efficiency. [,..].» 61 The administration concluded that, indeed, some mergers were done, but that they were far from being sufficient. Yet, there is no evidence that, before 1906, the administration really forced mergers or liquidations upon KVs. There is only evidence that verbal pressure increased.
The amendment law of 1906, then, made it possible for the regulator to formally force mergers or closures upon KVs ( §i77a and b). 62 Bertrams informed us that the liquidation of the St. Wendeler KV in 1906, for example, was a consequence of this new regulatory instrument. 63 On the whole, evidence does not suggest that mergers were a consequence of regulatory policy, but a result of business policy. Yet it remains quite unclear whether
KVs that absorbed another one did so to help the absorbed KV out of an actuarial trap or to seek one's own growth opportunities, or to please the regulator.
Merge or fail? An empirical model of mergers among Knappschaften
The previous section shed some light on the contemporaries' and the state's general position: that a larger size was better than a smaller size, and that small KVs were to be merged into others. Mine owners and administrative staff, as providers of the general intellectual input for KV management, could definitely have had some actuarial knowledge, although the extent of that is not completely clear from the qualitative evidence. In order to extend the qualitative analysis on mergers quantitatively, therefore, statistical model based on survival analysis will be presented in the following section. This model uses a set of explanatory variables on the KV-level to examine the probability with which a KV was either absorbed or liquidated given that it had reached particular points in time. 64 
Determinants of mergers and liquidations with explanatory potential
In the following, I briefly summarize the set of variables applied. Making a clear distinction between mergers and liquidations is important since the two modes of exit are not likely to be affected by covariates in the same way. Moreover, as was argued above, one basic business-related decision at any point in time was to decide whether to continue operation or to exit by merger or liquidation. By considering both modes of exit explicitly, this model goes beyond usual firm-survival models that merely consider exit per se as event. 65 The aforementioned discussion of contemporaries' views centered on the claim that KV size matters and that many KVs had still not reached the appropriate size; merging funds was proposed as an effective measure to increase their size and to improve the actuarial underpinnings of small KVs. In this context, KV size is hypothesized to play a major role in explaining exit decisions. As shown above, the annual size distributions were extremely unequal, and many KVs were arguably too small to operate on a sound actuarial basis. In order to measure the importance of that consideration, I incorporate several controls with respect to size in the model. First, current KV size is measured by the sum of contributors. Second, start-up size -the size of a KV in its first year, for which an observation is available -is also included. Another time-invariant variable is the geometrically averaged mean growth rate of KV size over a KV's entire life cycle; In the context of competing risk models, correlation could mean, for example, that the event «liq-uidation» either prevented the event «merger» from happening since it had happened first or that its presence as an alternative mode of exit had at least altered the probability of occurrence of merger ex ante.
we can call this variable the average biological interest rate of the KVs' PAYGO schemes. 66 It measures the long-term growth pattern and, thereby, gives an indication of structural change regarding the mining areas underlying the KVs' insurance. A negative average growth rate implies, by tendency, long-term shrinkage and, correspondingly, a positive one long-term prosperity.
Furthermore, I employ several measures of financial distress according to the «rescue-hypothesis». First, the invalids-to-contributors ratio (ICR) and the survivors-to-contributors ratio (SCR) measure the current burden with invalidity pensioners and with widows and orphans; these are the components of the pensioners-to-contributors ratio already introduced. The burden from pensioners increased for many KVs, especially for the comparatively smaller ones and those subjected to long-term structural decline. Besides, inclusion of those ratios follows directly from the functioning of the pay-as-yougo mechanism, which the KVs applied. 67 Depending on the development of wageshence productivity -the additional financial burden on contributors might, in the end, reduce disposable income and lifetime implicit rates of return. Second, the start-up ICR and the start-up SCR measure the initial burden from pensioners. In order to allow the effect of start-up size to vary with the initial burden from pensioners, I incorporate interactions of start-up size with the respective ratios. Third, analogous to the ICR and SCR, the sick-days-to-contributors ratio measures the financing burden on contributors that arose from the sickness insurance section. The more sick days the average contributor had to finance -caused by incentives for malingering, for example, 68 -the greater the financial pressure on a KV.
A few more variables are incorporated in the model to capture part of the heterogeneity among KVs. One variable is the share of established contributors among all contributors. Established contributors were in general more costly than non-established ones in that they often received higher benefits given equal contribution payments.
Against the background of an increasing ICR or SCR, a decreasing share of established miners may have released the KV from some financial pressure. Indeed, it may also indicate structural problems since ever fewer miners obviously had applied for established status, hence had not decided to enter into a long-term relationship with the KV. Following Guinnane and Streb, the firms' share in costs is included as well. 69 the young-to-old ratio equals the ratio between established contributors aged 16 to 35 and those aged 36 and older. This is a proxy measure for a KV's age structure. A continuously diminishing ratio can be interpreted as a hint at structural ageing of the contributor base. Indeed, data from the KV statistics show that this ratio varied notably across KVs.
The diversification of a KV's membership across the different mining subsectors is measured by a Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) using subsector shares for each KV (e. g. number of insurants employed in hard coal mining divided by number of all insurants; see Table one ). If a KV insured miners, who were employed in only one subsector, the HHI equals one. If insurants were equally distributed over all subsectors, the HHI equals 0.083. Hence, the closer the HHI is to the latter quantity, the less concen- If a KV was responsible for exactly one mine, the ratio equals one expressing that all miners could have been affected by an accident at the same time. The more mines a KV was responsible for, the smaller was the ratio and, hence, the lower was the potential for immediate financial disaster from correlated risks.
Finally, I include a variable that measures the business cycle to which KVs were subjected. The business cycle is measured in terms of the deviation ofhard-coal, browncoal, iron-ore, zinc-ore, lead-ore or copper-ore mined from trend production. Therefore the trends of those production series between 1861 and 1920 have been estimated on the level of mining-administration regions (the Oberbergamtsbezirke). 72 To each KV, I ascribe the trend deviation of the single most important product. I assume that steelworks were subjected to regional iron-ore trends, and salt works and stone pits were subjected to hard-coal trends (Dortmund) as well as iron-ore trends (Bonn and Halle).
Finally, explanatory variables were checked for multicollinearity by evaluating the pair-wise correlation coefficients across them. 73 As expected, there is a high correlation As argued above, KV size played a major role in the contemporary discussion, especially as it motivated merger activity. Therefore I expect to find size to be essential in explaining absorptions. In fact, current size, as the insignificance of coefficient (10) Although current size does not explain mergers, conditions right at the start, in 1861, did, indeed, matter. Start-up size has explanatory power in both models. Regarding absorptions, the model says that KVs that began with a high invalids-to-contributors ratio and a small size -coefficient (4) -were more likely to be absorbed at any point in time than KVs with the same initial burden with invalids, but a higher KV size. 75 This finding has two implications: First, starting positions predetermined, to some extent, the funds' future survival process. Second, the finding supports the «rescue-hypothesis».
Regarding liquidations, the effect of start-up size is significantly positive. 74 The estimated model is an exponential one. This means that a coefficient has to be interpreted as a semi-elasticity, which indicates by how many per cent the log hazard rate changes if the explanatory variable changes by unit. The log hazard rate is equal to the conditional probability of exit. 75 From a technical point of view, incorporating an interaction with the initial burden with invalids has the consequence that the effect of start-up size itself is evaluated at a value of zero of the interacted variable, and not at its mean. Accordingly, a significant interaction implies a modification of the coefficient.
Let us focus now on the financial distress variables, the ICR and SCR. While the current ICR does not help to explain absorptions -in particular not in the presence of the alternative «liquidation» -the current SCR does. The positive sign of coefficient (8) implies that the higher the current burden with survivors was, the more likely a KV was to become a target for absorption. This finding also makes the case for rescue-mergers that were motivated, in part, by the desire to protect survivors, who would have lost income in the case of liquidation. Yet, this finding does not explain why invalids were not statistically relevant for absorbing another KV. If all potential targets were, to some extent, burdened with pensioners, it might have been possible that KVs targeted on those with a less costly survivor burden. Regarding the competing risk «liquidation», both the ICR and SCR as main financial distress variables have no significant explanatory power.
Another important variable -not the least because of the coefficients' magnitude in both cases -is the young-to-old ratio, which measures a KV's age structure. Indirectly it measures the growth opportunities embedded in the respective mining area and, thus, how attractive it was for young people to enter the mining sector as new employees.
With respect to absorptions, coefficient (n) implies that the likelihood of becoming a target for merger by absorption increased notably if the young-to-old ratio was high. This is consistent with the idea that a KV, interested in improving its own financial position by absorption, absorbed another fund only if it was really attractive. A relatively high number of young relative to old contributors must have been appealing to a KV, especially to the mine owners, because this was a signal of prosperity. If KV board members were to ensure the future of their own fund, they had to ensure a steady future inflow of young insurants. This was definitely in the interest of mine owners who wanted to seek opportunities to keep costs low and to avoid dealing with <wounded> KVs. This view is supported by the finding on liquidations. If the ratio got worsehence the number of young miners declined relative to the number of old ones -KVs were liquidated. That is to say that KVs that were obviously suffering from a structural decline of the mining industry in their area were not attractive targets. This fact itself is straightforward. However, if the actors on the absorbing KVs' boards were of the same opinion as the contemporaries -namely that KVs in trouble were to be rescued -they did not draw the same conclusion, which was to perform corresponding rescue absorptions. The growth pattern variable, coefficient (6), points in the same direction.
The financing share of the firms, coefficient (13), implies that the higher the share was, the more likely a KV was to become a target of absorption. Board members of the potential absorber KV, especially the mine owners, might have interpreted a rise in that cost share in one of two ways. On the one hand, they might have found that it also signaled prosperity in the respective «targeted» mining area, which allowed the mine owners there to unburden insurants out of additional profits. Thus, it might have been attractive to incorporate those employers in one's own KV since they were obviously willing to contribute -or, at least, they were used to contributing -more. On the other hand, there is room to speculate about an alternative interpretation. A rise in the entrepreneurs' cost share could have also signaled growing financial distress, hence the opposite.
Given that contributors were already sufficiently burdened with the financing of costs, entrepreneurs were under pressure to inject additional resources in order to prevent the KV from being underfunded. Accordingly, the absorption would not have been done because of an advantage for the absorbing KV, but would have been more an insolvency avoidance merger. I tend to interpret the coefficient as implying growth potential.
Finally, and not surprising, KVs were also more likely to be absorbed if they were diversified over at least two mining subsectors. This finding also supports the «self-interests-hypothesis. However, contrary to my expectation, a decreasing potential for correlation of individual risks -which is not an actuarial disadvantage at all -drove the probability of liquidation up, not down. This observation is somewhat counter-intuitive. One of the following alternative explanations may apply: First, decision makers were simply not aware of those actuarial relationships, and so they were not relevant to the decision. Second, such an actuarial advantage is worth nothing if a KV faced structural or actuarial problems. Hence, if, in practice, the potential for correlation of risks might have decreased, this alone was not helpful. Prob > x' 0.00 0.00
Note: Displayed are coefficients, not hazard ratios. Standard errors in brackets are robust. For ties, the Bredow method is used. and * denote statistical significance on the one, fivi ; and ten per cent levels. Diversification 1 (HHI = 1) is reference and therefore omitted.
Conclusion
This paper deals with the occupational social insurance funds of Prussian miners and asks what might have motivated actors to enter into a long-term concentration process driven to a large extent by external growth. From the perspective of absorbed and, for comparative reasons, liquidated Knappschaften, the determinants of mergers and liquidations between 1861 and 1920 are explored particularly by use of statistical inference. In the current state, the regression model is intended to test indirectly for hypotheses on economic motivations.
Some of the findings supports the baseline hypothesis that mergers were a rescue measure. KVs could have entered a state of financial distress right from the start of the insurance system in the middle of the 1850s or over the course of the subsequent years.
Contemporaries linked financial distress of KVs with matters of size and the weakness of the PAYGO mechanism. Consequently, a solution to these problems, perceived to be of crucial importance for the long-term prospects of Knappschaft insurance, was commonly seen in mergers.
In addition, findings suggest even more strongly that the target, absorbed by other KVs must have been quite attractive ones. Having been in a state of financial distress was definitely not an attractive target characteristic. First, the higher both the ratio of young established contributors to old contributors and the entrepreneurs' financing share in total claims costs were, the more likely it is that a KV was absorbed; the effects were much higher than those supporting the «rescue»-hypothesis. Second, the more diversified a KV was over mining subsectors, the higher was the hazard of absorption.
Beyond that, the additional statistical evidence on liquidations does support the «self-interests-hypotheses, too. In the presence of the alternative «being merged into another KV», KVs exhibiting a bad age structure -indicative of recruitment problems -and a smaller or a diminishing size were liquidated. This implies that those KVs were not attractive enough to be rescued by absorption. Hence, the concentration process of the Prussian miners' social insurance funds was, indeed, a selection process of sorting out unsound funds, but not a process driven by acts of solidarity.
